TED2011
Ralph Langner: Cracking Stuxnet, a 21st-century cyber weapon
Knækning af Stuxnet, et 21. århundredes cybervåben
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Da den først blev opdaget i 2010, var Stuxnet computerormen en forbløffende gåde. Ud over det usædvanligt højt sofistikerede niveau gemte sig et mere nagende mysterium: Dets formål. Ralph Langner og hans hold hjalp med at knække koden der åbenbarede dette digitale våbens endelige mål -- og dets skjulte oprindelse. I et fascinerende indblik i cyber-opklaring, forklarer han hvordan.
Ralph Langner - Security consultant
Ralph Langner is a German control system security consultant. He has received worldwide recognition for his analysis of the Stuxnet malware. Full bio
Ralph Langner is a German control system security consultant. He has received worldwide recognition for his analysis of the Stuxnet malware. Full bio
Double-click the English transcript below to play the video.
00:15
The idea behind the Stuxnet computer worm
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Ideen bag Stuxnet computerormen
00:18
is actually quite simple.
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er faktisk ret simpel.
00:20
We don't want Iran to get the bomb.
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Vi ønsker ikke at Iran skal have bomben.
00:23
Their major asset for developing nuclear weapons
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Deres vigtigste aktiv for at udvikle kernevåben
00:26
is the Natanz uranium enrichment facility.
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er Natanz uranberigelsesanlægget.
00:30
The gray boxes that you see,
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De grå bokse som I kan se,
00:32
these are real-time control systems.
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det er realtids-kontrolsystemer.
00:35
Now if we manage to compromise these systems
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Hvis det lykkedes os at kompromittere disse systemer
00:38
that control drive speeds and valves,
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som kontrollere omløbshastighed og ventiler,
00:41
we can actually cause a lot of problems
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vi kan faktisk skabe en masse problemer
00:44
with the centrifuge.
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for centrifugerne.
00:46
The gray boxes don't run Windows software;
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Disse grå bokse kører ikke på Windows software,
00:48
they are a completely different technology.
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det er en helt anden teknologi.
00:51
But if we manage
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Men hvis det lykkedes os
00:53
to place a good Windows virus
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at placere en god Windows virus
00:56
on a notebook
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på en Notebook
00:58
that is used by a maintenance engineer
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som bruges af vedligeholdelsesingeniøren
01:00
to configure this gray box,
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til at konfigurere den grå boks,
01:03
then we are in business.
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så er vi kørende.
01:05
And this is the plot behind Stuxnet.
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Og dette er plottet bag Stuxnet.
01:08
So we start with a Windows dropper.
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Så vi starter med en Windows-afleveringsdel.
01:13
The payload goes onto the gray box,
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Virusen bliver placeret i den grå boks,
01:16
damages the centrifuge,
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ødelægger centrifugerne,
01:18
and the Iranian nuclear program is delayed --
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og det iranske atomprogram er forsinket --
01:20
mission accomplished.
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mission fuldført.
01:22
That's easy, huh?
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Det er let, hva?
01:24
I want to tell you how we found that out.
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Jeg vil fortælle jer hvordan vi fandt ud af dette.
01:27
When we started our research on Stuxnet six months ago,
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Vi startede vores undersøgelse af Stuxnet
for 6 måneder siden.
for 6 måneder siden.
01:30
it was completely unknown what the purpose of this thing was.
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Det var fuldstændigt ukendt hvad formålet
med denne ting var.
med denne ting var.
01:33
The only thing that was known
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Det eneste man viste var
01:35
is it's very, very complex on the Windows part, the dropper part,
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at Windows-delen var meget,
meget komplekst - afleveringsdelen,
meget komplekst - afleveringsdelen,
01:38
used multiple zero-day vulnerabilities.
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brugte flere zero-day sårbarheder.
01:41
And it seemed to want to do something
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Og det så ud som om den ville gøre noget
01:44
with these gray boxes, these real-time control systems.
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med disse grå bokse, disse realtids-kontrolsystemer.
01:46
So that got our attention,
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Så det fangede vores opmærksomhed,
01:48
and we started a lab project
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og vi startede et laboratorieprojekt
01:50
where we infected our environment with Stuxnet
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hvor vi inficerede vores miljø med Stuxnet
01:54
and checked this thing out.
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og prøvede tingene af.
01:56
And then some very funny things happened.
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Og nogle meget mærkelige ting skete.
01:59
Stuxnet behaved like a lab rat
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Stuxnet opførte sig som en laboratorierotte
02:02
that didn't like our cheese --
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som ikke kunne lide vores ost --
02:05
sniffed, but didn't want to eat.
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den snuste, men den ville ikke spise.
02:07
Didn't make sense to me.
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Det gav ikke mening for mig.
02:09
And after we experimented with different flavors of cheese,
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Efter at have eksperimenteret med
forskellige smage af ost,
forskellige smage af ost,
02:12
I realized, well, this is a directed attack.
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gik det op for mig: Dette er et målrettet angreb.
02:16
It's completely directed.
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Det er fuldstændigt målrettet.
02:18
The dropper is prowling actively
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Afleveringsdelen snuser aktivt
02:20
on the gray box
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på de grå bokse,
02:22
if a specific configuration is found,
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og hvis en specifik opstilling er fundet,
02:25
and even if the actual program code that it's trying to infect
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og hvis den specielle programkode
den prøver at inficere
den prøver at inficere
02:29
is actually running on that target.
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faktisk er der på målet.
02:31
And if not, Stuxnet does nothing.
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Hvis ikke, gør Stuxnet intet.
02:34
So that really got my attention,
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Så hvad der fangede min opmærksomhed,
02:36
and we started to work on this
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og hvad vi begyndte at arbejde med
02:38
nearly around the clock,
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næsten i døgndrift,
02:40
because I thought, "Well, we don't know what the target is.
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fordi jeg tænkte: "Well, vi ved ikke hvad målet er.
02:43
It could be, let's say for example,
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men det kunne være f.eks.
02:45
a U.S. power plant,
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et amerikansk kraftværk,
02:47
or a chemical plant in Germany.
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eller en kemisk fabrik i Tyskland.
02:49
So we better find out what the target is soon."
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Så vi må hellere finde målet hurtigt."
02:52
So we extracted and decompiled
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Så vi udtrak og dekompilerede
02:54
the attack code,
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angrebskoden,
02:56
and we discovered that it's structured in two digital bombs --
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og vi opdagede at den var struktureret
som to digitale bomber
som to digitale bomber
02:59
a smaller one and a bigger one.
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en lille en og en større en.
03:02
And we also saw that they are very professionally engineered
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Vi så også at de var meget professionelt fremstillet
03:06
by people who obviously had all insider information.
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af folk der åbenlyst havde insider information.
03:10
They knew all the bits and bites
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De kendte alle biderne af
03:12
that they had to attack.
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hvad de skulle angribe.
03:14
They probably even know the shoe size of the operator.
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De vidste sikkert også skonummeret på operatøren.
03:17
So they know everything.
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Så de vidste alt.
03:19
And if you have heard that the dropper of Stuxnet
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Og hvis I har hørt om afleveringsdelen af Stuxnet
03:22
is complex and high-tech,
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er kompleks og high-tech,
03:24
let me tell you this:
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så lad mig fortælle jer:
03:26
the payload is rocket science.
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Våbendelen er raketvidenskab.
03:28
It's way above everything
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Det var hævet over alt
03:30
that we have ever seen before.
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hvad vi har set før.
03:33
Here you see a sample of this actual attack code.
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Her har du et udsnit af den faktiske angrebskode.
03:36
We are talking about --
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Vi taler om
03:38
around about 15,000 lines of code.
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ca 15.000 linjers kode.
03:41
Looks pretty much like old-style assembly language.
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Det ligner til forveksling
gammeldags assemblersprog.
gammeldags assemblersprog.
03:44
And I want to tell you how we were able
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Og jeg ønsker at fortælle jer
hvordan vi var istand til
hvordan vi var istand til
03:46
to make sense out of this code.
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at få mening ud af denne kode.
03:48
So what we were looking for is, first of all, system function calls,
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Så først kiggede vi efter system-funktionskald,
03:51
because we know what they do.
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fordi vi ved hvad de gør.
03:53
And then we were looking for timers and data structures
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Derefter ledte vi efter timere og datastrukturer
03:57
and trying to relate them to the real world --
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og prøvede at forbinde dem til den virkelige verden --
03:59
to potential real world targets.
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til potentielle fysiske mål.
04:01
So we do need target theories
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Så vi havde behov for teorier om mål
04:04
that we can prove or disprove.
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vi kunne bekræfte eller afkræfte.
04:07
In order to get target theories,
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For at få nogle teorier om mål
04:09
we remember
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huskede vi på at
04:11
that it's definitely hardcore sabotage,
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det var definitivt hardcore sabotage,
04:13
it must be a high-value target
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det må være et mål af høj værdi
04:15
and it is most likely located in Iran,
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og det er højst sandsynligt placeret i Iran,
04:18
because that's where most of the infections had been reported.
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fordi det var her flest infektioner var rapporteret fra.
04:22
Now you don't find several thousand targets in that area.
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Man finder ikke mange tusinde mål i det område.
04:25
It basically boils down
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Det kan faktisk koges ned
04:27
to the Bushehr nuclear power plant
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til Bushehr atomkraftværket
04:29
and to the Natanz fuel enrichment plant.
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og til brændselsberigelsesfabrikken i Natanz.
04:31
So I told my assistant,
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Så jeg fortalte min assistent,
04:33
"Get me a list of all centrifuge and power plant experts from our client base."
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"Giv mig en liste over alle centrifuger og
kraftværkseksperter i vores kundekartotek."
kraftværkseksperter i vores kundekartotek."
04:36
And I phoned them up and picked their brain
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Og jeg ringede til dem og prikkede til deres hjerner
04:38
in an effort to match their expertise
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for at matche deres ekspertise
04:40
with what we found in code and data.
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med hvad vi havde fundet i koden og data.
04:43
And that worked pretty well.
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Og det virkede ganske godt.
04:45
So we were able to associate
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Så vi kunne forbinde
04:47
the small digital warhead
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den lille digitale våbendel
04:49
with the rotor control.
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med rotorkontrol.
04:51
The rotor is that moving part within the centrifuge,
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rotoren er den bevægelige del inde i en centrifuge,
04:54
that black object that you see.
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det er det sorte objekt I ser.
04:56
And if you manipulate the speed of this rotor,
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Og hvis man manipulerer hastigheden af denne rotor,
04:59
you are actually able to crack the rotor
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er du faktisk i stand til at ødelægge rotoren
05:01
and eventually even have the centrifuge explode.
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og eventuelt få centrifugen til at eksplodere.
05:05
What we also saw
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Hvad vi også så
05:07
is that the goal of the attack
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var at målet for angrebet
05:09
was really to do it slowly and creepy --
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var at gøre det så langsomt og snigende
05:12
obviously in an effort
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åbenlyst med et formål
05:14
to drive maintenance engineers crazy,
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at drive vedligeholdelsesingeniørene til vanvid,
05:17
that they would not be able to figure this out quickly.
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så de ikke ville være istand til at regne det ud for hurtigt.
05:20
The big digital warhead -- we had a shot at this
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Den store digitale våbendel -- vi fik et billede af den
05:23
by looking very closely
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ved at kigge meget tæt
05:25
at data and data structures.
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på data og datastrukturer.
05:27
So for example, the number 164
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Så for eksempel: tallet 164
05:29
really stands out in that code;
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gjorde sig bemærket i programmet,
05:31
you can't overlook it.
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du kan ikke overse det.
05:33
I started to research scientific literature
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Jeg kiggede i den videnskabelige litteratur
05:35
on how these centrifuges
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om hvordan disse centrifuger
05:37
are actually built in Natanz
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er opbygget i Natanz
05:39
and found they are structured
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og fandt at de var opstillet
05:41
in what is called a cascade,
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i hvad vi kalder i en kaskade,
05:43
and each cascade holds 164 centrifuges.
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og hver kaskade indeholder 164 centrifuger.
05:47
So that made sense, that was a match.
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Så det gav mening, det var et sammenfald.
05:49
And it even got better.
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Og det blev bedre.
05:51
These centrifuges in Iran
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Disse centrifuger i Iran
05:53
are subdivided into 15, what is called, stages.
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er underinddelt i 15, hvad vi kalder, trin.
05:57
And guess what we found in the attack code?
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Og gæt hvad vi fandt i angrebskoden?
05:59
An almost identical structure.
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En nærmest identisk struktur.
06:01
So again, that was a real good match.
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Så igen, der var et virkeligt godt sammenfald.
06:04
And this gave us very high confidence for what we were looking at.
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Og dette gav os en stærk overbevisning
om at vi kiggede efter det rigtige.
om at vi kiggede efter det rigtige.
06:07
Now don't get me wrong here, it didn't go like this.
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Misforstå mig ikke,
det gik ikke bare sådan af sig selv.
det gik ikke bare sådan af sig selv.
06:10
These results have been obtained
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Disse resultater blev opnået
06:13
over several weeks of really hard labor.
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gennem mange uger med virkeligt hårdt arbejde.
06:16
And we often went into just a dead end
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Og vi kom ofte ind i en blindgyde
06:19
and had to recover.
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og måtte starte forfra.
06:21
Anyway, so we figured out
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Hvor om alting er, så vi fandt
06:23
that both digital warheads
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at begge digitale våbendele
06:25
were actually aiming at one and the same target,
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var rettet mod det ene og samme mål,
06:27
but from different angles.
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men fra forskellig vinkler.
06:29
The small warhead is taking one cascade,
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Den lille våbendel tog en kaskade
06:32
and spinning up the rotors and slowing them down,
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og kørte op og ned for hastigheden på rotorene
06:35
and the big warhead
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og den store våbendel
06:37
is talking to six cascades
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talte til 6 kaskader
06:39
and manipulating valves.
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og manipulerede ventilerne.
06:41
So in all, we are very confident
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Så vi var faktisk overbevidste om
06:43
that we have actually determined what the target is.
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at vi havde bestemt hvad målet var.
06:45
It is Natanz, and it is only Natanz.
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Det er Natanz og det er kun Natanz.
06:48
So we don't have to worry
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Så vi skulle ikke bekymre os om
06:50
that other targets
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at andre mål
06:52
might be hit by Stuxnet.
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kunne blive ramt af Stuxnet.
06:54
Here's some very cool stuff that we saw --
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Her er noget virkeligt Cool som vi så --
06:57
really knocked my socks off.
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det virkeligt tog sokkerne af mig.
06:59
Down there is the gray box,
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Her nede i den grå boks,
07:01
and on the top you see the centrifuges.
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og du kan se centrifugerne på toppen.
07:04
Now what this thing does
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Hvad denne ting gør
07:06
is it intercepts the input values from sensors --
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er at opsnappe data fra sensorerne --
07:09
so for example, from pressure sensors
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så for eksempel, trykmålerne
07:11
and vibration sensors --
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og vibrationsmålerne
07:13
and it provides legitimate program code,
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og fodrer den oprindelige software,
07:16
which is still running during the attack,
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som stadigvæk kører under angrebet,
07:18
with fake input data.
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med falsk data.
07:20
And as a matter of fact, this fake input data
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Faktisk, denne falske data
07:22
is actually prerecorded by Stuxnet.
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er faktisk gemt i Stuxnet.
07:25
So it's just like from the Hollywood movies
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Det er ligesom i en Hollywood film
07:27
where during the heist,
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under et indbrud,
07:29
the observation camera is fed with prerecorded video.
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hvor overvågningskameraet,
viser en allerede optaget video.
viser en allerede optaget video.
07:32
That's cool, huh?
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Det er smart, hva?
07:35
The idea here is obviously
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Ideen her er åbenlyst
07:37
not only to fool the operators in the control room.
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ikke kun at narre operatørerne i kontrolrummet.
07:40
It actually is much more dangerous and aggressive.
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Det er faktisk meget mere farligt og aggressivt.
07:44
The idea
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Ideen
07:46
is to circumvent a digital safety system.
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er at omgå det digitale sikkerhedssystem.
07:50
We need digital safety systems
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Vi har behov for digitale sikkerhedssystemmer
07:52
where a human operator could not act quick enough.
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hvor en menneskelig operatør
ikke kan nå at reagere hurtigt nok.
ikke kan nå at reagere hurtigt nok.
07:55
So for example, in a power plant,
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Som for eksempel i et kraftværk,
07:57
when your big steam turbine gets too over speed,
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når de store dampturbiner, roterer for hurtigt,
08:00
you must open relief valves within a millisecond.
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så skal du åbne sikkerhedsventilerne
indenfor millisekunder.
indenfor millisekunder.
08:03
Obviously, this cannot be done by a human operator.
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Åbenlyst, dette kan ikke udføres
af en menneskelig operatør.
af en menneskelig operatør.
08:06
So this is where we need digital safety systems.
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Så det er her vi har brug for
digitale sikkerhedssystemmer
digitale sikkerhedssystemmer
08:08
And when they are compromised,
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Og når de er kompromiterede
08:10
then real bad things can happen.
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så kan der ske rigtigt grimme ting.
08:13
Your plant can blow up.
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Dit kraftværk kan eksplodere.
08:15
And neither your operators nor your safety system will notice it.
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Og hverken dine operatører eller
dit sikkerhedssystem vil opdage det.
dit sikkerhedssystem vil opdage det.
08:18
That's scary.
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Det er skræmmende.
08:20
But it gets worse.
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Men det bliver værre.
08:22
And this is very important, what I'm going to say.
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Og dette jeg siger nu er meget vigtigt.
08:25
Think about this:
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Tænk over dette:
08:27
this attack is generic.
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Dette angreb var generisk.
08:30
It doesn't have anything to do, in specifics,
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Det havde intet at gøre, specifikt
08:34
with centrifuges,
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med centrifuger,
08:36
with uranium enrichment.
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med uranberigelse.
08:39
So it would work as well, for example,
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Så det vil virke, som for eksempel
08:42
in a power plant
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i et kraftværk
08:44
or in an automobile factory.
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i en bilfabrik.
08:47
It is generic.
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Det er generisk.
08:49
And you don't have -- as an attacker --
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Og du har ikke behov for - som angriber -
08:51
you don't have to deliver this payload
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du behøves ikke at aflevere våbendelen
08:54
by a USB stick,
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med en USB-stick,
08:56
as we saw it in the case of Stuxnet.
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som vi så det med Stuxnet.
08:58
You could also use conventional worm technology for spreading.
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Du kan bruge almindelig ormeteknologi til spredning.
09:01
Just spread it as wide as possible.
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Bare sprede det så bredt som muligt.
09:04
And if you do that,
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Og hvis du gør det.
09:06
what you end up with
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Hvad du ender med
09:08
is a cyber weapon of mass destruction.
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er et cyber-masseødelæggelsesvåben.
09:14
That's the consequence
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Dette er konsekvensen
09:16
that we have to face.
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som vi må tage højde for.
09:19
So unfortunately,
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Så uheldigvis
09:22
the biggest number of targets for such attacks
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det største antal af mål for disse angreb
09:25
are not in the Middle East.
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er ikke i Mellemøsten.
09:27
They're in the United States and Europe and in Japan.
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De er i USA, i Europa og i Japan.
09:30
So all of the green areas,
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Så alle de grønne felter,
09:32
these are your target-rich environments.
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det er målrige områder.
09:35
We have to face the consequences,
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Vi må se konsekvenserne i øjnene,
09:38
and we better start to prepare right now.
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og vi må hellere starte med at forberede os nu.
09:41
Thanks.
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Tak.
09:43
(Applause)
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(Bifald)
09:49
Chris Anderson: I've got a question.
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Chris Anderson: Jeg har et spørgsmål.
09:53
Ralph, it's been quite widely reported
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Ralph, der har været skrevet
09:55
that people assume that Mossad
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at folk anser Mossad
09:57
is the main entity behind this.
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for at være hovedkraften bag dette.
09:59
Is that your opinion?
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Er det din mening?
10:02
Ralph Langner: Okay, you really want to hear that?
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Ralph Langner: Okay, vil du virkelig høre det?
10:04
Yeah. Okay.
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Tja, Okay.
10:06
My opinion is that the Mossad is involved,
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Efter min mening er Mossad involveret
10:09
but that the leading force is not Israel.
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men den ledende kraft bag er ikke Israel.
10:12
So the leading force behind that
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Så den ledende kraft bag
10:14
is the cyber superpower.
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er cybersupermagten.
10:17
There is only one,
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Og der er kun en,
10:19
and that's the United States --
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og det er USA.
10:21
fortunately, fortunately.
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heldigvis, heldigvis.
10:23
Because otherwise,
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Fordi ellers
10:25
our problems would even be bigger.
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ville vores problemer være endnu større.
10:28
CA: Thank you for scaring the living daylights out of us. Thank you, Ralph.
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CA: Tak for at skræmme livet af os. Tak Ralph.
10:32
(Applause)
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(Bifald)
ABOUT THE SPEAKER
Ralph Langner - Security consultantRalph Langner is a German control system security consultant. He has received worldwide recognition for his analysis of the Stuxnet malware.
Why you should listen
Ralph Langner heads Langner, an independent cyber-security firm that specializes in control systems -- electronic devices that monitor and regulate other devices, such as manufacturing equipment. These devices' deep connection to the infrastructure that runs our cities and countries has made them, increasingly, the targets of an emerging, highly sophisticated type of cyber-warfare. And since 2010, when the Stuxnet computer worm first reared its head, Langner has stood squarely in the middle of the battlefield.
As part of a global effort to decode the mysterious program, Langner and his team analyzed Stuxnet's data structures, and revealed what he believes to be its ultimate intent: the control system software known to run centrifuges in nuclear facilities -- specifically, facilities in Iran. Further analysis by Langner uncovered what seem to be Stuxnet's shocking origins, which he revealed in his TED2011 talk. (PS: He was right.)
Ralph Langner | Speaker | TED.com